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Background
Pre-pandemic inﬂ   uenza preparedness is regarded as a 
critical function of public health [1] but in the midst of 
diﬃ   cult economic conditions it can present a signiﬁ  cant 
challenge to both developed and developing nations. To 
eﬀ   ectively detect a potential pandemic in the earliest 
possible stage, international health organizations 
recognized the need for all countries, regardless of size, 
to develop sensitive surveillance systems to be able to 
detect the entry of novel viruses into the population [2].
Barbados is the most easterly island in the Caribbean 
Sea, measuring 166 square miles with an estimated 
mid-year population in 2009 of 275,719 [3]. Barbados’ 
per capita GDP was USD 11.9 thousand in 2009, and 
approxi  mately eleven percent of total government 
expenditure is spent on health care [4]. Primary health 
care is available to all citizens free of charge through 
government run community based health centres 
(polyclinics). Alternatively, persons may also access 
primary health care through a thriving private sector. In 
2009, the island was regarded as having a very high 
human development, ranking 37th on the Human 
Develop  ment Index scale [5].
Having been overwhelmed by the complexity of the 
response needed for the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) epidemic, Barbadian public health 
professionals put various measures in place to improve 
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Public Healthits response in the event of a pandemic. In accordance 
with the resolution at the 58th World Health Assembly 
(WHA) entitled Strengthening Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza 
Prepared  ness and Response [6], Barbados developed a 
National Inﬂ  uenza Pandemic Preparedness Plan (NIPPS) 
in August 2006 [7]. In September 2007, a pandemic ﬂ  u 
outbreak training workshop was held and a pandemic 
manual was subsequently developed. Th  is manual was 
later revised by a team of managers of the public 
community health centres, and a two day seminar was 
held in April 2009 for private and public sector health 
care professionals to launch this protocol and to educate 
participants regarding the appropriate response to 
dangerous infectious diseases. Th  ese measures were 
accomplished through technical cooperation with the 
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the 
Caribbean Epidemiological Centre (CAREC).
In 2007, the National Inﬂ   uenza Surveillance System 
was revitalized beginning with surveillance of cases of 
acute respiratory illness (ARI) at the countries eight 
community health centres which served as sentinel sites. 
Th  ese sentinel sites (polyclinics) are located at strategic 
points across the island (Figure 1). Th   is was expanded in 
January 2008, to include the island’s lone tertiary public 
hospital where cases of severe acute respiratory illness 
(SARI) are detected routinely through active surveillance.
Barbados’ NIPPS plan follows international guidelines 
with recommendations for both pharmaceutical and 
non-pharmaceutical interventions to be implemented at 
various stages of a pandemic. In April 2009, when the 
World Health Organization (WHO) announced that the 
world was experiencing an inﬂ  uenza  pandemic, 
Barbadian public health oﬃ   cials responded to the threat. 
In this paper, we examine the response of public health 
professionals in implementing plans regarded as best 
practice for developed nations and consider the 
peculiarities of implementation in a small island state.
Methods
Data for this study was collected using Barbados’ 
National Inﬂ   uenza Surveillance System which is 
comprised of ten sentinel sites, responsible for sending 
weekly notiﬁ  cations to the Ministry of Health of ARI 
and SARI. Using guidelines provided CAREC [8], a case 
was reported as an ARI if it met the following case 
deﬁ   nition: acute (sudden) febrile illness (>38.0ºC or 
100.4ºF) in a previously healthy person, presenting with 
cough or sore throat with or without respiratory 
distress. Cases were reported as SARI if they presented 
a sudden onset of fever over 38ºC, cough or sore throat, 
shortness of breath or diﬃ   culty breathing, and required 
hospital admission.
During the pre-pandemic period, as part of routine 
surveillance, nasopharyngeal swabs were taken from all 
cases of SARI detected at the hospital sentinel site and a 
sample of six swabs from patients meeting the criteria 
of ARI from two of the most centrally located 
ambulatory sites. In April 2009, after the announcement 
by the WHO that the world had entered pandemic 
phase ﬁ  ve, an enhanced testing strategy was introduced 
and all primary health care facilities, both private and 
public, were asked to take nasopharyngeal swabs from 
all persons who presented with fever (>38ºC) with 
respiratory symptoms and a travel history to an aﬀ  ected 
area. When sustained community transmission of 2009 
H1N1 was established, this testing strategy was 
returned to the pre-pandemic level.
Nasopharyngeal samples taken from suspected cases 
were sent ﬁ  rst to the Barbados Public Health Laboratory 
(local) where they underwent preliminary screening 
using immunoﬂ  uorescence testing. Using this method, it 
is possible to detect inﬂ   uenza A virus, adenovirus, 
respiratory syncitial virus, parainﬂ  uenza types 1, 2 and 3 
and inﬂ  uenza B. All samples which met the criteria for 
testing, irrespective of result, were sent to CAREC. At 
the peak of the epidemic in the Caribbean, Barbadian 
health oﬃ   cials began sending some samples to the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 
Atlanta, Georgia in an attempt to reduce the burden 
being placed on CAREC. Th   e CDC and CAREC 
collaborated during the outbreak to provide critical 
guidance and technical capacity to the region.
During the pandemic, the Ministry of Health’s public 
health oﬃ     cials convened meetings of the National 
Pandemic Planning Committee which met at least 
weekly for the ﬁ  rst two months of the declaration of a 
pandemic and then monthly for the duration of the 
outbreak in Barbados. A smaller Technical Command 
Committee was also convened to manage the response 
to the pandemic and met weekly. At the end of the 
outbreak period in Barbados, a formal evaluation was 
conducted by many of the major stakeholders within the 
health sector. Th  e pharmaceutical and non-pharma-
ceutical interventions (NPIs) implemented as a result of 
these meetings form the basis of the results presented in 
this paper.
The evidence surrounding the use of some NPIs to 
delay spread of infection in a pandemic has been found 
to be weak [9,10,11]. Aledort et al. published a 
systematic review which examined the literature and 
also made recommendations based on expert opinion 
in cases where there were no or very low quality 
articles available as a study. Here we consider the 
pharma  ceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions 
carried out by the Government of Barbados through 
the Ministry of Health, and compare these inter-
ventions to the recommendations of the article by 
Aledort et al [9].
Sobers-Grannum et al. BMC Public Health 2010, 10(Suppl 1):S10 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/10/S1/S10
Page 2 of 8Figure 1. Map of Barbados with location of public hospital and community-based health centres (polyclinics).
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Overview of cases
On June 3, 2009, Barbados reported its ﬁ  rst case of 2009 
H1N1. From June until October 2009 there were 155 
conﬁ  rmed cases of 2009 H1N1 (Figure 2). Since October 
24, 2009, there has only been one conﬁ  rmed case of 2009 
H1N1, which occurred in January 2010. Th   e cases range in 
age from 23-days-old to 65-years-old, with a mean age of 
17-years-old; the greatest proportion of our cases occurred 
in the 5-14 age group and the second highest in the 15-24 
age group. A little more than half (53.5%) of all conﬁ  rmed 
2009 H1N1 viral infections occurred in females. Th  e  most 
common presenting symptoms were fever - 92.9% (144 
cases); and cough or sore throat - 82.6% (128 cases). Only 
35.5% (55) of cases presented with gastrointestinal 
symptoms. Of the 155 conﬁ  rmed cases, there were three 
fatalities, which occurred in persons with underlying 
chronic conditions, all of whom were morbidly obese.
For the outbreak period (June to October 2009), the 
surveillance team received reports of 2,483 cases, 
compared to 412 cases for the same period in 2008. Th  ere 
were 179 SARI cases from June to October 2009, 6% (10) 
of which required ventilation and care in the intensive 
care unit. During this time there were seven SARI deaths. 
Of these, four received nasopharyngeal swabs that were 
tested for 2009 H1N1 and three tested positive.
Th   e total hospitalization rate due to SARIs for the year 
2009 was 90.1 per 100,000 people, compared to 7.3 per 
100,000 people for 2008. Th   e highest hospitalization rate 
occurred in children less than one year (400 per 100,000) 
followed by those 1 to 4 years old (290 per 100,000).
Non-pharmaceutical interventions
Human surveillance
Case reporting and early rapid viral diagnosis
During the initial phases of the pandemic while 
knowledge of the virus’ characteristics was limited, all 
suspected cases in the island were reported to the Oﬃ   ce 
of the National Epidemiologist and nasopharyngeal 
swabs taken. All cases suspected of having 2009 H1N1 
were investigated and close contacts monitored until the 
results of the swab were obtained. As the outbreak 
advanced, only laboratory-conﬁ  rmed cases and suspected 
hospitalized cases were reported. Immuno  ﬂ  ourescent 
testing was done on the swabs in country to test for 
inﬂ  uenza A virus, but this test was incapable of subtyping 
and thus swabs had to be sent to a regional centre for 
real-time polymerase chain reaction testing to be done. 
Th   is resulted in wait times for results that averaged one 
week but were occasionally as long as six weeks. Rapid 
testing was not utilized in Barbados.
Hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette and disinfection
Th  e Ministry of Health placed great emphasis on hand 
hygiene and respiratory etiquette in its communication 
messages to the public. Th  e  WHO Outbreak Communi-
cation Guidelines [12] were used as the risk communi-
cation guide in responding to the emergence of 2009 
H1N1 in our community. Th   ese guidelines use trust, early 
announcements, transparency, listening and planning as 
key components of risk communication [12]. Several 
protocols were distributed on hand hygiene to schools, 
day care centres, workplaces and the general public. An 
infectious waste protocol was developed to guide health 
facilities in the disposal of infectious waste.
Surgical and N95 masks and other Personal Protective Equipment
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) was donated by the 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in 
May 2008 and USD 40,500 in supplies was approved for 
the ﬁ  nancial year (2008/2009) and utilized in 2009/2010. 
During the pandemic large amounts of PPE were used in 
both the public and private sector and a protocol 
governing distribution and usage was developed and 
Figure 2. Laboratory confi  rmed cases of 2009 H1N1 by epidemiological week. 1Epidemiological (EPI) Weeks as used in the Caribbean are 
simply a numbering of the weeks of the year running from January to December. EPI week 21 ends May 30, 2009; EPI week 42 ends October 24, 
2009.
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Page 4 of 8circulated. Th   e central storage facility has been improved 
upon during this time but remains challenged by lack of 
security to prevent theft and insuﬃ   cient  human 
resources for eﬃ   cient stock-taking.
Patient management
Isolation of sick individuals
As part of their eﬀ  orts towards pandemic preparedness, 
the Ministry of Health in Barbados held a seminar in 
April 2009, at which they disseminated a manual on 
management of Dangerous Infectious Diseases to 
middle- and senior-level managers of at least 90% of 
health care facilities in the country. Th   is manual provided 
detailed instructions to health care leaders on the struc-
ture and type of isolation facilities that ought to be 
available at their facility.
During the outbreak, health care facilities attempted to 
follow these evidence-based guidelines but were 
challenged in some regards by their existing structures 
and layout, and restricted by the high costs that would 
have been necessary to change these facilities. Th  e 
island’s lone public hospital is the only major health 
centre with designated isolation facilities but its capacity 
was signiﬁ  cantly overwhelmed during the outbreak. Th  e 
community health centres created temporary isolation 
areas by reorganizing, and in some cases, curtailing 
routine services. Administrators and health care 
providers remained committed to the principles of 
patient isolation for dangerous infectious diseases and 
have stated their intention to revise their protocols so 
that there are evidence-based and yet feasible and 
practical for each facility.
Contact management
Quarantine and contact tracing
Ministry of Health oﬃ   cials took the decision early in 
the pandemic that there was insuﬃ   cient  evidence  to 
support quarantining of asymptomatic persons who had 
been in contact with a probable or conﬁ  rmed case or 
had travelled to an aﬀ   ected area internationally. Th  e 
protocol adopted for contact tracing varied according to 
whether persons were regarded as probable or 
conﬁ  rmed cases.
A probable case is an individual with an inﬂ  uenza test 
that is positive for inﬂ  uenza A, but is unsubtypable by 
reagents used to detect seasonal inﬂ  uenza virus infection, 
or  an individual with a clinically compatible illness or 
who died of an unexplained acute respiratory illness, and 
who is considered to be epidemiologically linked to a 
probable or conﬁ  rmed case.
A close contact is an individual who has cared for, lived 
with or had direct contact with respiratory secretions or 
body ﬂ  uids of a probable or conﬁ  rmed case of inﬂ  uenza 
A/H1N1. For probable cases, close contacts were 
followed at home and work. Contact tracing was 
coordinated by the Medical Oﬃ   cer  of  Health 
(community-based public health leader) and a team 
operating within the community. Close contacts with 
symptoms were isolated at home or in hospital depending 
on the severity of symptoms. Contacts were given a short 
sensitization session and fact sheets on hand hygiene, 
respiratory etiquette and proper cleaning methods of 
laundry and other household items.
Community restrictions
School and workplace closures
At the peak of the epidemic in Barbados, many primary 
(ages 5-11) and secondary schools (ages 11-18) reported 
absenteeism rates from schools ranged from as low as 9% 
to as high as 40%. Based on the latest available evidence, 
the Ministry of Health, in collaboration with Ministry of 
Education, decided not to close schools in hope of 
preventing further spread because the beneﬁ  t of doing so 
was not suﬃ     cient enough to justify the social and 
economic consequences of such an action. Th  ere was 
still, however, some disruption within schools. At the 
start of the pandemic each school that was aﬀ  ected 
through infection by either students or teachers, was 
visited by public health oﬃ   cials to educate and allay fears 
of mass morbidity and mortality. Th   is meant that classes 
were cancelled for approximately 1-2 hours in each case 
as fears were addressed. Public health oﬃ   cials also visited 
the workplaces of the ﬁ   rst reported cases to conduct 
similar educational seminars, so some productivity would 
have been lost during that time. One school, however, 
reported high (75%) absenteeism among staﬀ  ,  which 
resulted in education oﬃ     cials making the decision to 
close the school to prevent issues of discipline and 
security from arising.
Cancellation of group events
Th  e ‘Crop Over Festival’ is Barbados’ major cultural 
extra  vaganza for the calendar year and is a signiﬁ  cant 
source of revenue for the island. Th   e festival is held from 
July to August each year and is characterized by social 
gatherings throughout the season, which may range from 
100 to 30,000 persons. Given the available evidence, the 
decision was taken not to cancel any of the events 
associated with the festival, but ill persons were asked 
not to attend the gatherings. Patrons were asked to 
refrain from their usual custom of waving rags and using 
shared drink containers. Th   e festival activities were used 
to educate the populace in the use of appropriate hand 
hygiene and respiratory etiquette. Th  is education was 
done using calypso jingles that represent the signature 
musical genre of the festival, as well as through 
distribution of ﬂ   yers along the highways as persons 
engaged in the festivities.
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Pharmaceuticals – oseltamivir
Th  e Barbados Drug Service was able to procure 49,000 
courses of oseltamivir (Tamiﬂ  u) as part of pre-pandemic 
preparedness. A protocol was developed by the Ministry 
of Health to manage the distribution of Tamiﬂ  u in both 
the private and public sector. Th  is protocol was ﬁ  rst 
circulated in May 2009, and use was restricted to those 
with moderate to severe respiratory illness who met the 
case deﬁ  nition of a suspected case, which at that time 
included fever, cough and/or sore throat and a travel 
history to an aﬀ  ected area. As the disease became more 
widespread in Barbados, the case deﬁ   nition for a 
suspected case of H1N1 was modiﬁ   ed to exclude the 
travel requirement, and Tamiﬂ  u usage was thus increased. 
As more information became available about the virus, 
the protocol was revised; in July 2009 those with mild 
respiratory illness who had certain speciﬁ  ed  chronic 
diseases and those with moderate to severe illness were 
eligible to receive Tamiﬂ  u.  Th  e drug was widely used 
throughout the outbreak and no cases of resistance were 
reported.
Pharmaceuticals – vaccine
Plans for procurement of 2009 H1N1 vaccine were made 
through the Revolving Fund of the Pan American Health 
Organization. A conference of the Sub-Regional Work-
shop for the Planning of Pandemic Vaccine Introduc tion 
was attended by Ministry of Health oﬃ   cials to develop a 
plan for the deployment of the vaccine within two to four 
weeks after its arrival on the island. Th   e plan, which was 
based on a PAHO vaccination guide [13], identiﬁ  ed 
health care workers, pregnant women, and persons over 
six months with underlying diseases as the main target 
groups for vaccination. Th  e initial target was 50,000 
doses based on estimations of prevalence of the diseases 
in the Barbadian population. Due to economic con-
straints and estimates of anticipated vaccine uptake, the 
actual number of doses acquired by the government was 
20,000 doses at a cost of approximately USD 150,000. 
Th  is cost includes only that of the actual vaccine and 
excludes the extra supplies and human resources that 
would be needed to administer the vaccine. Th  e 
vaccination campaign began in February 2010. After four 
weeks, 39% of the estimated target group had been 
reached—51% of health care workers, 10% of pregnant 
women and 31% of persons who had been targeted with 
chronic disease. Th   e vaccine campaign was extended for 
a further 6 months; 10,900 (54%) doses of the vaccine 
have been utilized.
Discussion
Generally, public health leaders in Barbados responded 
quickly and decisively to the threat of pandemic 2009 
H1N1. Protocols were developed, disseminated and 
adhered to in the majority of the private and public 
sector. Th  e response was characterized by technical 
cooperation between public and private sector within the 
country as well as regional (PAHO and CAREC) and 
extra-regional (CDC) alliances. Th   e risk communication 
techniques employed served to construct and reaﬃ   rm 
partnerships and reassure the Barbadian public. One 
local newspaper produced a headline at the start of the 
outbreak remarking on the public’s “Calm Response to 
H1N1” [14].
Most of the non-pharmaceutical interventions employed 
(Table 1) closely followed recommendations made by 
international organizations such as the WHO and CDC 
[15,16,17]. For example, hand hygiene and respiratory 
etiquette which received the strongest evidence in the 
scientiﬁ  c literature [18,19,20,21] formed the foundation 
of Barbados’ pandemic response.
For interventions with less conclusive scientiﬁ  c 
evidence, social and economic factors weighed heavily in 
deciding whether or not to include them. Th   e use of rapid 
tests in the pre-pandemic and early pandemic phases was 
recommended Aledort et al [9]. However, the recom-
men  dation was made with the reservation that these tests 
often have suboptimal sensitivity [9,22]. Several other 
sources advised against the use of these tests [16]. In 
Barbados, having weighed the beneﬁ  ts of rapid diagnosis 
against the high costs and wide margins of error, the use 
of rapid tests was decided against.
Aledort et al. recommended against the use of surgical 
and N95 masks for the general public  at all pandemic 
phases with the exception of the advanced stage where it 
is stated that the evidence was inconclusive [9]. However, 
Jeﬀ  erson et al. have shown that in health care settings, 
the use of masks could reduce the transmission of 
inﬂ  uenza [23]. In Barbados’ response, persons entering 
health care facilities such as the polyclinics were asked to 
wear surgical masks.
It is diﬃ     cult to determine the true impact of 2009 
H1N1 as compared to regular seasonal inﬂ  uenza in the 
island since the National Surveillance System is still 
relatively new. In fact, virological surveillance was 
practically non-existent prior to the announcement of 
pandemic phase ﬁ  ve. Th   is component of surveillance was 
present in the protocol but lacked suﬃ   cient physician 
motivation and thus Ministry of Health oﬃ   cials used the 
opportunity of the emerging virus to encourage the 
taking of nasopharyngeal swabs.
Conclusions
Th  e number of conﬁ   rmed cases was small, but the 
signiﬁ   cant surge in ARI and SARI cases noted at the 
sentinel sites indicate that the impact of the virus on the 
island was moderate. Barbados enjoyed excellent political 
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was challenged by limited ﬁ  nancial resources. As a result 
of 2009 H1N1, virological surveillance has improved 
signi ﬁ  cantly and local, regional and international partner-
ships have been forged and in some cases strengthened.
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